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What Determines Cartel Success? 
Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow1 
 
Section I:  Introduction 
 “…[H]ow multitudinous are the devices by which industrialists have attempted to restrict 
international competition.”  (Great Britain Board of Trade 1944, p. v)     
Although difficult at times to uncover, cartels are far from rare.  Nussbaum estimates that 
international cartels controlled approximately 40% of world trade between 1929 and 1937 (1986, 
p. 134).  As a result of the increased prosecution of international cartels during the 1990s, we 
have a new set of cartels that are ripe for study.2  While it is generally agreed that cartels are not 
as pervasive in Western economies today, these contemporary cartels have certainly affected 
hundreds of millions of dollars of sales.3 
Empirical research on cartels has a long history that both benefits and suffers from the variety of 
methodological approaches that have been used to examine cartels.  This paper examines the 
evidence and results of these varied empirical studies of cartels and asks three sets of questions.  
First, how do we define and measure cartel success and failure? Second, what do we know about 
the difference between successful and unsuccessful cartels, between industries that are prone to 
collusion and industries where it is rare?  Third, what methodological approaches are best 
designed to answer these questions?  What can we learn from cross-section studies that examine 
cartels in many industries?  What kinds of questions are better addressed through the industry-
specific case studies that have been the focus of most recent research on cartels?    How should 
students of cartels approach the study of these new cartels so as to provide the basis for a deeper 
understanding of the underlying dynamics of cartels and to inform anti-trust policy in the future? 
Section II of the paper examines cross-sectional studies of cartels.  It presents a set of stylized 
facts on cartel stability, duration, and profitability based on the findings of the cross-section 
literature.  We compare the mean and variance of cartel length in cross-section studies.  We find 
this comparison revealing, as it highlights the robustness of the extremes.  That is, every data set 
gathered includes short-lived and long-lived cartels.  This leads to a discussion of the 
determinants of cartel longevity and a comparison of the primary causes of cartel breakdowns or 
renegotiations across samples of cartel activity.  Section III investigates a set of case studies of 
                                                                 
1 U of Massachusetts (mlevenstein@econs.umass.edu)  and U of Michigan Business School (suslow@umich.edu)  
2  The Department of Justice has recently turned its attention and resources to prosecuting international cartels that 
have a significant effect on prices paid by U.S. consumers.  During the 1990s the DOJ uncovered international 
cartels in a wide range of markets.   
3Levenstein and Suslow (2001), provide a very rough estimate for the potential effects of recent international cartels 
on developing countries:  “In 1997, the latest year for which we have trade data, developing countries imported 
$81.1 billion of goods from industries which had seen a price-fixing conspiracy during the 1990s.  These imports 
represented 6.7% of imports and 1.2% of GDP in developing countries” (p. 2).  
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cartels, comparing the characteristics of these particular cases with the stylized facts presented in 
Section II.  We then examine the same issues regarding the determinants of cartel success as 
discussed for cross-section studies, as well as additional insights that case studies provide.  
Section IV compares the characteristics of international cartels in the 1990s with those discussed 
above, and asks whether the stylized facts regarding industry characteristics hold for this 
particular set of cartels.  We briefly discuss recent contributions examining the determinants of 
success of these cartels.  We urge that future studies of these and other cartels learn from and 
build on earlier work on cartels.  Concluding remarks are given in Section V. 
Section II:  Cross-Section Studies  
There is considerable disagreement among economists and policymakers about how stable 
cartels are and how successful they are at increasing profits.  Cartel behavior is usually 
clandestine, and cartel data sets (whether cross-section or single industry) are plagued with 
measurement error, unobservable variables, and sample bias.  Thus, there are remarkably few 
rigorously established generalizations that we can make about cartel behavior or success.  We 
know that cartels do occur, and we know that they do break down.  There seem to be certain 
industries where cartels or cartel attempts appear to recur.  Beyond this, our empirical 
generalizations are qualified and cautious. 
Because the variables measured and the analytical methodologies employed are so dissimilar, 
one can compare the early cross-section work on cartels only in the broadest of terms.  In order 
to assure that we are comparing apples to apples and oranges to oranges, we first discuss cross-
sectional studies of U.S. cartels.  Then we separately examine cross-sectional studies of 
international cartels. 
One branch of the empirical cartel literature begins with Richard Posner’s (1970) path breaking 
study of firms prosecuted for price-fixing by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  His goal was to determine the shared characteristics of these price-fixing cases.  Hay & 
Kelley (1974), Asch & Seneca (1975), and Fraas & Greer (1977) all take this approach.  The 
advantage of this approach is that the legal cases themselves (especially those that were tried and 
not settled) produced a great deal of data.  Posner, for example, assembles a sample of 989 
horizontal conspiracy cases from 1890 to 1969.4 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of collusion in each of the U.S. price-fixing samples.  The 
mean number of firms ranges across the samples from 7.25 to 29.1, but the majority of price-
fixing agreements involved fewer than 10 members (79% of Hay and Kelley’s sample, 60% of 
Fraas and Greer’s sample, and 64% of Posner’s sample).  Trade association involvement 
occurred primarily when the conspiracy consisted of a large number of firms (roughly one-third 
of the cases).  The surprising absence from Table 1 of what most would consider basic factors 
influencing cartel success, such as demand elasticity and lumpiness or infrequency of orders, 
indicates how difficult it is to gather such data for broad cross-sections involving hundreds of 
firms in a variety of industries. 
                                                                 
4 Appendix A outlines the data sets used in each of these studies. 
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These early cross-section studies highlight several interesting cartel characteristics, but because 
of the likely bias in the data due to its peculiar selection criteria, later research moved to studying 
cartels outside of the United States, where antitrust laws were historically less stringent (certainly 
prior to World War II, and in many countries for decades after).  International cartels have 
historically assumed that they were signing legal, but not enforceable contracts.  Germany, where 
courts ruled that cartel contracts were enforceable, was the exception.5  Although cartel member 
firms (or at least the non-U.S. firms) did not have to fear prosecution, they still had to solve 
privately the classic cartel incentive problem caused by conflicting individual and cooperative 
interests.  Cartel members could communicate, seek information, and enforce penalties in an 
overt manner, but they could not rely on a third party to enforce the agreement. 
Here we review five cross-section studies of international cartels:  Eckbo (1976), Griffin (1989), 
Suslow (1991), Marquez (1994), and Dick (1996).  The first four studies use samples of 
international cartels that begin before World War II; some remain active through the early 1980s.  
Andrew Dick’s data set is comprised of Webb-Pomerene export cartels over the period 1918-65.  
We also discuss another survey of international cartels, the Great Britain Board of Trade study 
conducted by the British government after World War II.  This monograph presents a great deal 
of interesting information, but not in a way that is easily quantifiable.6 
1. Cartel Profitability 
Most cartel scholars who work with cross-section data use duration to measure cartel success, 
well aware that duration is a highly imperfect proxy for performance.7  Cartels can and do 
survive as de facto organizations without having a significant effect on price.8  Data limitations 
force many to proxy cartel duration with the length of the formal agreement, which is itself 
problematic.  Following the literature, much of this chapter’s discussion of cartel success focuses 
on the determinants of cartel duration.  Before we do so, however, we discuss the limited cross-
section results on the profitability of international cartels. 
Eckbo (1976) and Griffin (1989) both attempt to measure profits. Eckbo studies both the 
characteristics and the performance of international cartel agreements using an international 
cartel data set of 51 cartel agreements in 18 industries.  The cartels in the sample date from late 
1800s to the 1960s.  Nineteen of the fifty-one cartel agreements are labeled “efficient,” defined 
as able to “raise price 200% above the unit cost of production and distribution” (Eckbo 1976, p. 
                                                                 
5 German courts generally treated cartel contracts as enforceable agreements from 1870 until the end of World War 
II, when the occupation forces established U.S.-type anti-trust law. 
6 Each of these data sets are described more fully in Appendix A.   
7 The price-cost margin literature is much more sophisticated in its attempts to tie margins to industry and firm 
characteristics.  See, for example, Domowitz, et al (1986).  This is an interesting literature, but hard to map to cartel 
performance because we do not know whether there was a formal cartel in the industries that are found to have high 
price-cost margins. Another class of studies looks at the effect of antitrust prosecution on prices.  For example, 
Sproul (1993) surveys 25 price-fixing cases between 1973-1984, and follows the price four years after the 
indictment.  He finds a slight (7 percent) increase in prices for the entire sample.  However, the evidence for those 
cases filed after 1976 (i.e., after the antitrust penalties were significantly increased), shows that price declines at first  
but then rises about 17 months after the indictment. 
8 For example, the British Government survey of cartel agreements reports that “[t]here is indeed, sufficient 
evidence to show that in some industries the agreements were not carried out or were carried out only in part” (1944, 
pp. xli-xlii). 
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26).  Griffin (1989) computes the average Lerner Index for the 54 cartels in his sample.  He finds 
an average Lerner Index of 0.31.  The most “successful” cartel (the rubber cartel of 1923 to 
1928) has an estimated Lerner Index of 0.80, while the least successful cartel (the wheat cartel 
from 1933 to 1934) still charged a price below cost so that its Lerner Index was –0.12.  These 
results point to two important themes that we will come back to throughout the paper. First, 
cartel prices should, in principle, be compared to the prices that would obtain in the presence of 
competition.  For example, in the depth of the Great Depression, an extremely successful cartel 
might still have charged a price below cost.  Unfortunately, cartel studies rarely have enough 
information to take account of such issues.  Second, as we will see in our discussion of duration, 
the overarching finding in the study of cartels is variation in outcome.  Some cartels are very 
successful at increasing prices and profits, while others are dramatic failures. 
2. Cartel Duration 
Cartel duration may be more easily observed than excess cartel profits, but the interpretation of 
the observed pattern of cartel duration is more complicated than a novice might suppose.  This is 
because one of the most clearly established patterns is that cartels form, endure for a period, 
appear to break down, and then re-form again.  Thus the empiricist is faced with the question, did 
she observe two short-lived cartels?  Or one long-lived cartel?  Does this process of cartel 
breakdown and reformation represent cartel success or cartel failure?  A variety of theoretical 
models have provided rationalizations of this phenomenon, but different explanations have very 
different implications for anti-trust policy. 
Stigler (1964) argues that this pattern reflects fundamental cartel instability: the primary 
challenge to cartel success is the possibility of incumbent firms’ cheating on the agreement.  The 
repeated breakdown and re-formation of cartels reflects the occurrence of such cheating, 
suggesting that cartels are generally not able to meet this challenge and are, hence, not internally 
stable creatures. 
In the hands of modern game theorists, Stigler’s observations have been reincarnated with an 
entirely different policy implication.   
… collusive conduct may … result in a pattern … marked by recurrent episodes 
in which price and profit levels sharply decrease. ….  Thus we reject the received 
view that performance of this type necessarily indicates an industry where firms 
are engaging in a sequence of abortive attempts to form a cartel. Since this 
opinion is often used … to deny the need for intervention to promote competition 
in such industries … our argument suggests the need to re-examine a widely held 
assumption about policy (Green and Porter 1984, p. 88).  
Building on Stigler’s intuition that the possibility of cheating is the major threat to cartel 
stability, Green and Porter (1984) show that price wars can themselves be the solution that the 
cartel needs to achieve stability.  Cartel members refrain from cheating lest it push the industry 
into a price war.  The observation of changing behavior on the part of cartel members is entirely 
consistent with a cartel being able to raise prices and profits above the competitive level.  Periods 
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of low prices do not reflect the end of the cartel but are an information cost that arises from 
firms’ inability to perfectly monitor one another’s behavior.9 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) present a different explanation of fluctuations in cartel behavior.  
Even when, as in their model, cartel members can observe one another’s output decisions, so that 
there is no uncertainty about whether a competitor has cheated on a collusive agreement, 
successful collusion still requires that firms have an incentive not to cheat.  A cartel’s ability to 
raise price over the competitive level depends on the relative size of contemporary competitive 
profits and future cartel profits.  For example an increase in current period demand increases the 
incentive to cheat on the cartel agreement, requiring an adjustment in the cartel price to prevent 
such cheating.  Thus, even though cartel members never cheat and the cartel never breaks down, 
the cartel price fluctuates in response to shocks to demand.  If this is the explanation of the 
observed cycling of cartel behavior, the best anti-trust policy may be expansionary 
macroeconomic policy.   
Finally, Slade suggests that price wars may erupt as a result of learning or asymmetry.  In this 
case, the empiricist’s simplistic observation is correct: what looks like the end of a cartel is, in 
fact, a real breakdown in collusion.  The breakdown is not caused by the cheating hypothesized 
by Stigler, but rather by permanent structural shifts that require renegotiation among cartel 
members  (Slade 1989, May 1990). 
The average cartel in these various studies lasted between 3.7 years and 7.5 years (Table 2) – 
which is either a very long time or a very short one depending on who is judging.10, 11  The 
minimum reported estimate of 3.7 years, comes from Suslow (1991), who tries to link cartel 
dissolution to a specific event in the market which caused a restructuring of the cartel. 12  The 
standard deviation of cartel duration ranges from approximately 2.4 years (Eckbo’s “Sample 1”) 
to 6.3 years (Griffin).  Examining individual cartels reinforces this picture of variety in cartel 
outcomes.  The shortest cartel in Eckbo’s “Sample 2” survived less than a year and the longest 
lasted 18 years.13  In Griffin’s sample, the minimum cartel duration is one year, and the 
maximum is 29 years, both in the same market – wheat.  As shown in Table 2, roughly half of 
the cartels studied lasted less than five years, but a significant fraction (between 12 and 37 
                                                                 
9Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) extend Green and Porter’s model by expanding the set of possible strategies 
beyond trigger strategies and allowing firms to choose the optimal strategy that maximizes expected profits.  More 
generally, Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986) discuss specific ways of solving the 
imperfect monitoring version of the general Folk Theorem result.  The Folk Theorem states that, with infinite 
repeated interaction and sufficiently low discount rates, there exists an equilibrium set of strategies that support any 
level of profits between zero and the joint profit maximizing level (Friedman 1971). 
10The Great Britain Board of Trade study reports that the term of the typical cartel agreement varies considerably 
from cartel to cartel; most often it is from 3-5 years (British Government 1944, p. xiii). 
11 All of the international samples contain cartels that were abruptly ended by the start of World War II.  Average 
duration can vary substantially within these samples, depending on whether all cartel episodes or only “uncensored” 
episodes are used to calculate the mean. 
12 Suslow (1991) defines distinct cartels within an industry if the cartel contract was restructured either after the exit 
of a key member or to incorporate a significant new member.  A distinct cartel is not defined if a lesser country 
joined an agreement already in progress without prompting a change in the other cartel contract provisions.  This 
method of dating cartel episodes yields duration estimates shorter than those specified in the actual written cartel 
contracts.  
13 There are several cartel episodes in Sample 2 that lasted less than a year, which leads Eckbo to code them as “0” 
in length.   This is one reason for the relatively high standard deviation of 4.7 years in Eckbo’s Sample 2.   
 6
percent) lasted more than ten years.  It is difficult, then, to pigeonhole cartel longevity.  Some 
cartels can barely get off the ground, while others last for decades. 
And some do both.  Table 3 presents duration statistics for a number of industries in which 
cartels appear repeatedly.  Some cartels re-formed several times within a very short span of 
years, others went off and on over fifty years or more.14  In some cases, such as the copper cartel, 
each period of cartelization appears to endure for longer than the previous one.  This suggests a 
pattern of learning on the part of cartel members.  In others, there is no obvious pattern: cartel 
episodes may be long or short, or very long or very short.   
Table 3 demonstrates two other important issues in studying cartels.  First, simply measuring 
duration is plagued with pitfalls because researchers can disagree on exactly where to place the 
beginning and end of a particular cartel episode.  Eckbo and Griffin both study the sugar cartel 
with overlapping samples for roughly a thirty-year period.  However, they disagree significantly 
on the precise timing of the many sugar cartels.  
Second, the sugar industry experience illustrates an instance where firms repeatedly turned to 
cartels to try to increase profits, but apparently with little success, even in the short run.  
According to Eckbo, all of the sugar cartels were less than one year in duration, except for one 
ten-year spell.  Why do firms keep trying to coordinate pricing when it not successful?  It is 
possible that there is an empty core, i.e., the competitive equilibrium is not stable, leading to an 
incentive to form coalitions, but then these coalitions are themselves unstable.  This could lead to 
a disequilibrium phenomenon of cycling in and out of collusion.15  But it is also possible, as 
Green and Porter (1984) suggests, that these “breakdowns” are evidence of equilibrium price 
wars and should be treated as a single cartel of long duration.  On the other hand, if Stigler is 
correct, and these cartels have failed, each should be counted as a distinct cartel.  The empirical 
literature has yet to come to terms with this fundamental question. 
3. Determinants of Cartel Profitability 
Griffin (1989) and Eckbo (1976) provide the only systematic cross-section regressions relating 
cartel profitability to industry and cartel characteristics.  They both find that cartel profits are 
increasing in industry concentration and cartel market share (Table 4)  They also both conclude 
that homogeneity of firms within the cartel increases cartel success: Eckbo finds that “efficient” 
cartels tend to consist of firms with similar costs, while Griffin finds that cartels that are made up 
of a small number of similar sized firms are more able to raise price.  Griffin creates a measure 
of internal cartel organization that attempts to capture the extent of control that the cartel has 
over member operations.  Griffin finds that more centralized cartels are more effective at raising 
                                                                 
14 Similar studies have also been done for U.S. price-fixing samples.  Bosch and Eckard (1991) present an estimate 
of the number of firms indicted multiple times by the DOJ.  Over the period 1962-80, they estimate that 1300 firms 
were indicted for price fixing:  “The proportion of recidivists (as much as 4 times) in our sample is roughly 14%” (p. 
309, footnote 1). 
15 For more details of behavior in the sugar industry see Eichner, (1969), and Genesove and Mullin (1998, 2001); for 
a discussion of empty core models, how they compare to cartel models, and empirical tests, see Telser (1985), 
whose article discusses the existence of market equilibrium, Sjostrom (1989), who tests his  theory with data from 
ocean shipping markets, and Pirrong (1992), who expands the empirical tests on ocean shipping by emphasizing the 
roles played by demand divisibility and discontinuities in marginal cost. 
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price.16  He concludes,  “For those searching for a magical equation by which to predict the 
monopoly power of the cartel, these results are disappointing …[P]robably of greater importance 
is that each cartel’s monopoly power has been influenced by individual, cartel-specific effects, 
such as market conditions unique to that period, the personality attributes of key cartel 
organisers, and so forth” (Griffin 1989, p. 195).  We will return to this theme below. 
Although Griffin and Eckbo’s work are the only extensive cross-section studies of cartel 
profitability, others provide related evidence.  Asch and Seneca (1976) and Fraas and Greer 
(1977) attempt to distinguish statistically between industries prone to collusion and industries 
without cartels.  Asch and Seneca find that poor profit performance is associated with collusion, 
although they are not sure why.17  They try to associate this low-profit characteristic with other 
measurable characteristics.  For example, they find that firms characterized by low profits and 
low rates of sales growth demonstrate a tendency towards collusive behavior.  They also find that 
large, low-profit firms are clearly associated with collusive behavior to a much greater degree 
than small, high-profit firms. 
Table 5 shows where these studies were able to identify statistically significant differences 
between collusive and non-collusive industries.  A “+” sign in Table 5 indicates that this variable 
was positively and significantly associated with collusion, while a “-“ sign indicates a negative 
and significant association.  For example, Asch and Seneca find that large firms are more often 
convicted of collusion.  On the other hand, industries with high entry barriers are less likely to be 
found in the collusive sample.   
Regrettably, Table 5 has limited usefulness in advancing our knowledge of which factors make 
collusion possible or successful.  That is because these studies do not tell us this.  All we know is 
that these are the characteristics associated with price-fixing cases that were prosecuted.  The 
disadvantage of working with these data is sample selection bias.  As Posner notes, we cannot be 
sure whether these are samples of firms that are collusion-prone or prosecution-prone.18  Asch 
and Seneca, for example, obtain the seemingly perverse result that low profit firms are more 
likely to collude.  It is hard to know whether low profits spurred these firms to collusion, which 
is possible, or whether these were particularly unsuccessful price-fixing conspiracies – and 
therefore all the more obvious to anti-trust authorities. 
Cross-section studies have had limited success at both measuring cartel profitability and 
estimating its determinants.  The results that one can draw from the literature are sensible:  firms 
in concentrated industries are more likely to collude and are more likely to raise prices by doing 
so.  Cartels are more likely to form where members have similar interests and where cartels are 
able to control member behavior.  Cartels with these features are also more likely to be 
                                                                 
16 Griffin does not elaborate on how he measures organization.  He simply states that it “is a subjective measure 
assigned after reading the available descriptions of the effectiveness of the cartel structure” (Griffin 1989, p. 191). 
17 Asch and Seneca do not know whether the 50 randomly selected “non-colluding” firms were in fact not colluding, 
only that they were not prosecuted for price fixing. 
18 Posner’s data show that a large proportion of the DOJ cases and an even larger proportion of FTC's cases are 
brought in industries with low concentration.  One explanation is that “the methods used by the Department to detect 
and prove price fixing are such that marginal conspiracies in markets of low concentration are likely to be 
substantially over-represented in the Department's 'catch'…[C]onspiracies that have a large number of members...are 
most likely to generate the crucial evidence of agreement" (Posner, 1970, p. 410). 
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successful.  But there is still enormous variation in industry conduct and in cartel success, even 
controlling for industry structure. 
4. Determinants of Cartel Duration 
There are a variety of reasons to expect that cartel duration is negatively related to the number of 
firms in the cartel and in the industry.  A large number of firms creates coordination problems, 
increases the likelihood that there exists a firm willing to cheat, etc.  The empirical results, 
however, are ambivalent on this question (Table 6).  Posner and Dick actually find that cartel 
duration increases with the number of firms. Using his large sample of 989 Department of Justice 
cases, Posner finds that 52 percent of the cartels with 10 or fewer members persisted for 6 years 
or more.  But duration was even longer for cartels with more than 10 firms; 64 percent lasted 6 
years or more.  Hay and Kelley do not have enough dispersion their much smaller sample to test 
for an effect of the number of firms on cartel duration.  However, they do note that the majority 
of conspiracies lasting 10 or more years were in concentrated markets.  
The empirical analysis of the equally intuitive presumption that industry concentration and high 
cartel market share increase the duration of a cartel is borne out in the international cross-
sections.  Dick, Marquez, and Suslow all find that cartel duration increases with the share of the 
market controlled by cartel members (Table 6).  Hay and Kelley find that industry concentration 
is associated with increased cartel duration (Table 6). 
Another important aspect of industry structure for cartel duration, highlighted by Stigler (1964) 
is the presence of large customers.  Stigler hypothesized that large customers would increase the 
incentive for a cartel member to defect and, therefore, contribute to cartel instability.  Dick tests 
this proposition for his Webb-Pomerene cartels and finds that cartels selling to relatively larger 
buyers tended to dissolve sooner (Dick 1996, p. 261).  As shown in Table 6, other cross-section 
studies have not included downstream industry structure in their studies though this does seem 
like an issue for which a cross-sectional methodology could be useful.   
As discussed above, demand fluctuations play an essential role in several different models of 
cartel stability, and most cross-sectional studies have included a demand-related variable.  The 
particular measures vary from study to study depending on the particular model specified (and, 
of course, the actual data availability).  To distinguish between the Green-Porter prediction that 
price wars will arise in response to unobserved negative demand shocks and the Rotemberg-
Saloner prediction of “price wars during booms,” Dick tests whether his sample of Webb-
Pomerene cartels were more or less likely to collapse during downturns in export demand (Dick 
1996, p. 271). 19 He finds that cartels were more likely to end during anticipated downturns, but 
that their stability was unrelated to unanticipated business cycle fluctuations.  
Marquez focuses on the rate of growth of demand.  He finds that an increase in demand growth 
has a negative effect on duration, but not a significant one.  Comparing his results with others in 
the literature, Marquez conjectures that the effect of demand growth on cartel duration is 
dependent upon both the country composition of the sample and the sample period (Marquez 
1994, p. 338).  Suslow (1991) focuses instead on deviations from trend demand and finds that 
                                                                 
19 His measure of demand variability is the coefficient of variation of an index of quarterly export prices for one of 
four broad product categories during the cartel’s life span. 
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demand uncertainty is the most important single variable in explaining cartel contract duration – 
more important than either the industry structure or cartel organization variables. 
The British Government Study (1944) noted that cartel instability is a prominent feature in those 
industries susceptible to “violent” changes in economic conditions.  More stable industries – 
such as matches, electric lamps, and quinine – saw steady cartel activity over long periods 
(British Government 1944, p. xxxii).  This finding is consistent with the econometric results 
described above – demand instability appears to destabilize cartels.   
Finally, most studies note that internal, organizational variables often seem important in 
determining the success and durability of any cartel.  Despite the difficulty in capturing these 
organizational variables quantitatively, several studies have made useful inroads in this area. 
Suslow finds, for example, that variables measuring the existence of penalties, patents, and 
narrowness of product scope all have a positive, significant effect on duration.  Also, the more 
experienced the cartel, and the more specialized and complex the governance structure (greater 
use of penalties and of central sales agencies, for example), the longer the cartel is likely to 
endure.20  The British Government study comes to a similar finding regarding the importance of 
organizational variables. Cartel agreements were rarely renewed without substantial modification 
to the cartel organizational form or penalty structure (British Government 1944, p. xxxi). 
Another way to approach the determinants of cartel duration is to examine the immediate cause 
of the cartel dissolution.  Several of the international cross-section studies do systematically 
examine breakdowns.  Eckbo categorizes cartel failures with a series of binary variables:  Was 
the breakdown market related or political?  If market related, was it due to external forces?  If 
externally caused, was it an increase in non-member supply that strained cooperation to the 
breaking point?  A tabulation of the results of his investigation is shown in Table 7.  The main 
reason, as most theorists would suspect, is internal conflict or defection, accounting for 10 of the 
23 breakdowns, or roughly 44 percent.  The same holds true for the twenty-nine Sample 2 cartel 
episodes:  59 percent ended due to internal conflict.  In Suslow’s sample, it is also true that 
internal conflict and cheating ended a large majority of cartels, second only to the fact that many 
cartels in her sample were brought to an end by World War II. 
As with Eckbo, Griffin also looks into the reasons for cartel “disintegration.”  He finds that for 
his sample of 54 cartels, 27 ended for primarily political reasons.  New entry or the use of 
substitutes ranks second, with a count of 18.  What Griffin calls “behavioral problems” or 
“opportunistic behavior” caused another 14 to fail.  This category includes cheating and 
disagreement over market shares, encompassing both what we would classify as “monitoring” 
price wars and “bargaining” breakdowns.  World War II brought 12 cartels to an end.  Finally, 
technological change was decisive in ending 4 cartels (rubber, zinc, sulphur, and nitrate). 
5. Summary of Results from Cross-Section Studies 
We can make the following generalizations from the international cartel cross-section work, with 
a few specific comments on lessons we can extract from U.S. price-fixing cases: 
                                                                 
20 However, when a dummy variable is included in the regression analysis to capture pre-WWI cartel experience of 
16 industries in the sample, Suslow (1991, p.23) finds no significant effect on post-WWI cartel episode duration. 
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· Cartels with greater market share and in more highly concentrated industries endure longer 
than those with lower market share and in less concentrated industries.  In the U.S., price 
fixing is more frequent (or more frequently prosecuted) in industries with fewer firms or 
greater concentration. 
· Faster growth in trend demand is associated with shorter cartels, as are business cycle 
downturns.  In general, instability in the economic environment destabilizes cartels. 
· Cartel organization and the history of the cartel are important, but difficult to measure.  In the 
U.S., price fixing appears more frequently in homogeneous product markets, perhaps 
indirectly indicating that these cartels are easier to organize.  Also, cartels in the U.S. often 
rely on trade associations to help with cartel organization when there are a large number of 
firms in the industry. 
· Cartels reappear in some industries, and cartel duration tends to increase with industry 
experience with collusion. 
· Other than WWII, cheating is the most common cause of breakdowns in international cartels. 
Section III.  Case Studies  
We turn now to an examination of a set of recent case studies of cartels.  This is, admittedly, a 
very unscientific sample.  These studies were selected based on our own familiarity with the 
cases and, in some instances, prior knowledge that the authors looked at issues in which we were 
interested.21 Most of these studies make more explicit use of the modern game theoretic literature 
than do the cross-sectional studies surveyed above.  In this section we will compare the findings 
of these studies with cross-section results presented above.  In particular, we examine the 
stylized facts regarding profitability and duration and discuss their implications for the 
determinants of profitability and duration. 
Case studies can provide us with a richer information set about a particular industry and its 
experience with cartel agreements.  The equilibrium outcome in game theoretic models of 
collusive behavior often turns on small differences in the information set that each player has and 
the conjectures each player makes about the other players’ behavior.  A firm that has participated 
in a series of cartel agreements over the years with the same set of industry players probably has 
definite priors about how they will react in response to changes in strategy.  A case study may do 
a much better job of identifying these critical subtleties than the typical cross-section study.  By 
studying the interaction of one set of firms in depth, we can learn more about expectations and 
beliefs and how these expectations are affected by past management strategies.  The downside to 
the case study approach is that the generalizations necessary to develop policy are much more 
difficult to make.  For example, consider a case study that convincingly demonstrates that a 
particular kind of vertical restraint was used to stabilize a particular cartel.  What should we 
conclude?  Such a finding means neither that such a restraint is always used for collusive 
purposes, and so should be prohibited by anti-trust authorities. Nor does it imply that such a 
restraint is necessary for cartel success, so that anti-trust authorities could restrict their attention 
                                                                 
21 See Appendix B for the list of cases.  
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to industries where such contracts were used.  Case studies have provided useful comment on 
game theoretic models, but it has been much harder to move from case study analysis to policy 
recommendations.  We attempt to bridge that gap here. 
1. Cartel Profitability 
Most modern case studies pay surprisingly little attention to evaluating the success of cartels.  
Perhaps we are just so happy to have the detailed data made possible by case studies that we are 
inclined to assume that the cartel is successful, and that we are learning from the case study 
about how successful cartels operate.22  There are a few studies, though, that take the question 
seriously.  The methodological questions can be separated broadly into three areas:  use of price 
to measure success, comparison of good times against price wars to measure success, and, as 
always, using duration as a proxy for success.  Here we survey the findings of studies taking 
these different approaches, and we point out the common pitfalls. 
Because quite a few cartels were formed following a decline in price (either because of entry, 
market integration, technological change, or a decline in demand), cartel prices and profits might 
well be lower, or at least not higher than, those that prevailed in the pre-cartel period.  A fall in 
profits after the formation of a cartel does not necessarily mean that the cartel was not successful.  
Profits might be higher than would have been the case in the absence of the cartel.  
With this caution in mind, Table 8 reports changes in prices and profits in our sample of sixteen 
cartel case studies.23  Virtually every cartel case study surveyed here reports that the cartel was 
able to raise prices immediately following cartel formation.  Most case studies do not compare 
cartel prices with the competitive price (or any other counterfactual price).  In the bromine and 
ocean shipping cases, the cartels were reportedly able to raise price to the joint profit-
maximizing level.  In the case of German steel, cartel prices were lower than the joint 
maximizing price, but still significantly above the competitive price.  In cases where the cartel 
was regional or national, the cartel price may be compared to the world price.  In two such cases,  
cement and oil, national cartels were able to raise prices above the world price.  Thus, there is 
ample evidence of price increases, but this evidence is often fragmentary.  In many cases, it is 
not the right kind of evidence to determine conclusively whether the cartel raised prices and 
profits above what they would have otherwise been. 
It is also important, when evaluating the success of a cartel, to look at more than just the price 
the cartel charges during “collusive” periods.  As many of these industries have periods of price 
wars or other breakdowns in collusion, the success of the cartel must be measured in terms of 
overall profitability, not just the profitability of periods in which high prices are charged, no 
matter how briefly.  For example, during the 1930s, U.S. breweries cooperated to raise prices, 
probably increasing prices to levels that were actually higher than the joint-profit-maximizing 
                                                                 
22 Of course, there are also studies that deny that what they are studying is a cartel.  Firms may get together and fix 
prices, but, it is argued, the economic result is not to restrict output and raise prices relative to what would occur in 
the absence of such cooperation (Leach 1994; Pirrong 1992; Sjostrom 1989).  (Why rational, profit-maximizing 
firms who cooperate in setting prices would refrain from trying to increase profits is a bit of a mystery, but one that 
is beyond the scope of this paper.)  This paper does not address these largely normative questions; we presume that 
firms are using whatever means are at their disposal to raise profits. 
23 The sources for these case studies are reported in Appendix B. 
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price in order to assuage prohibitionists concerns (which remained influential immediately 
following Repeal).  But these high prices were not sustainable.  McGahan (1995) found that the 
industry had price wars in each of the three years in which it attempted to collude.  
2. Cartel Duration 
The issues that arose in measuring cartel duration in cross-section studies do not disappear when 
one turns to case studies.  The difference is only that the economists’ choices become more 
visible to the reader.  For example, conflict over the terms of a cartel agreement may lead to a 
price war.  Such price wars, termed “bargaining price wars” by Levenstein (1996) in her 
examination of the bromine cartel, can in principle, through careful case study, be distinguished 
from those that represent a "punishment phase" (à la Green-Porter) of an ongoing cartel.  Gupta 
(1997) also finds evidence of bargaining price wars for the tea industry cartels in 1931 and 
1932.24 
It is also important not to equate formal duration with success.  There are cases in which the 
formal structure of the cartel is maintained, but declining market share undermines the cartel’s 
ability to raise price above the competitive level.  This was the case, for example, in the mercury 
industry (MacKie-Mason and Pindyck 1987).  The industry apparently managed a very 
successful cartel from 1928 to 1950; in 1950 collusion broke down in a dispute regarding a large 
Italian sale to the U.S. government stockpile.  The cartel was re-established in 1954 and prices 
rose to very profitable levels.  But high prices induced entry, and after 1965 the cartel’s share of 
world output declined. The cartel continued its formal existence but had little impact on prices.  
Another attempt at cartelization was made in 1975, including countries representing 60-80% of 
world production, but the “new cartel was unsuccessful” (MacKie-Mason and Pindyck 1987, p. 
197).25 
Table 9 presents duration statistics from sixteen cartel case studies.  Comparing Table 2 and 
Table 9, we find that cartel longevity for this set of sixteen industries, with fifty cartel episodes 
among them, is longer than was the average duration for the cross-section studies discussed 
above.  The mean duration is 17.2 years (median of 8 years), rather than the roughly 4 to 8 year 
average found in cross-sections.  The variance in cartel longevity for the cases reported in Table 
9 also far exceeds that for the cartels studied in cross-sections, which was itself sizeable.  Cartel 
duration ranges from less than one year (in the case of several cartels that barely or never got off 
the ground) to 100 years between the formation of the DeBeers diamond cartel and its first 
breakdown.  The standard deviation of cartel duration of this admittedly non-random sample is a 
whopping 18.3 years.  One suspects that this variance reflects scholars’ tendency to select 
industries for case study that have either a long history of cartel activity or an interesting history 
of on-again off-again cartel episodes.  In any case, the lesson learned once again is that cartels 
cannot be categorized as “short” or “long” – they are both.26 
                                                                 
24 These “bargaining price wars” are similar to what Slade (May 1990) calls “asymmetric information price wars.” 
25 Note that MacKie-Mason and Pindyck (1987) appear to measure success by examining price trends.  Falling 
prices, which continued after the formation of the new cartel, may have reflected the failure of the cartel.  But 
demand was also declining.  Falling prices therefore might still reflect a successful cartel, when measured against 
the (counter-factual) prices that would have prevailed absent a cartel. 
26 It also reinforces the point made above that there are inherent sample selection problems in cartel studies. 
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There is substantial variation in the duration of cartels both within a single industry and across 
industries.  That two of the most stable cartels in this set are both South African – the DeBeers 
diamond cartel and the South African cement cartel – highlights the importance of particular 
cultural and institutional environments.  But we also find very stable cartels in the United States, 
such as the parcel post (Railroad Express) cartel that was in force for much of the nineteenth 
century.  Both ocean shippers and mercury producers have also managed to sustain long lasting 
cartels.   
The least stable cartel in this group is the one that has received the most attention of late, the 
nineteenth century railroad cartel known as the Joint Executive Committee (JEC).  The JEC data, 
studied by Ulen (1979), Porter (1983), and others, show fairly conclusively that switches in 
conduct occurred in the late nineteenth century railroad industry.27  Even in the notoriously 
unstable railroad industry, the JEC looks short-lived.  The longer periods of railroad cooperation 
reported in Table 9 are all from southern railroads.  The northern railroads did not manage to 
sustain cooperation for more than two or three years, before the establishment of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), except in cases where there was another large, outside player, 
such as Standard Oil. 
In this set of case studies there are several cartels that got off to a rocky start and then managed 
to sustain collusion for longer periods.  This was the case for the railroad-oil, tea, potash, and 
sugar cartels.  It appears that the participants learned about each other and about organizational 
features that would help to support collusion in their industry.  It seems likely that this kind of 
early history of failure characterizes many successful cartels.  In many cases, these early failed 
attempts may have left little or no historical record.  This kind of learning appears to continue in 
many of the European cartels; the post – World War I steel and potash cartels, for example, 
display more complex organizational structures than did their pre-war predecessors.  In contrast, 
the change in institutional and economic environment seems to have limited the usefulness of 
pre-World War I or National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) cartel experience for many U.S. 
industries.  Alexander (1994) convincingly argues that in many industries firms did learn to 
cooperate during the NIRA period in ways that improved their ability to limit price cooperation 
even after explicit collusion was prohibited.  This does not show up in our table because the new 
form of cooperation was generally not a formal cartel.28 
Of course, in other industries, early failures never lead to successful collusion.  It is important, as 
a matter of anti-trust policy, that we learn to distinguish failed attempts that pave the way for 
future collusion from failed attempts that reflect the inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in 
a particular industry.  One can speculate that there are a large number of industries that followed 
the pattern of the Canadian oil industry, in which the failure to sustain collusion led to 
consolidation of the industry (Grant and Thille, 2001).  This has certainly been asserted about the 
attempts to control prices in the U.S. trusts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Similarly, the repeated failure of railroads to sustain collusion is often offered as an explanation 
for the creation of the ICC.  With state power, the ICC could accomplish for the railroads what 
they could not accomplish with voluntary accords (MacAvoy 1965, Kolko 1965).   
                                                                 
27 See Slade, May 1990, pp. 531-32 for a complete discussion. 
28 See Levenstein (1996) and Genesove and Mullin (1999) for further discussions of learning about cartel design.   
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Case studies that examine failed attempts to form cartels add enormously to our understanding of 
the basic cartel problem.  A close examination of the reasons for failure would illuminate our 
understanding of why cartels appear where they do and the extent to which successful cartels are 
idiosyncratic in nature or endemic to certain industries.  Because successful cartels are more 
likely (despite the cartels’ best efforts) to leave records than are failed cartels, and because 
success is more appealing as a subject of study, most studies focus on successful cartels.  There 
is also a certain reluctance to label a cartel a failure, even when it might be more informative to 
do so.  One important exception is MacAvoy’s (1965) study of nineteenth century railroad 
cartels.  He argued strongly that these cartels failed because of the impossibility of preventing 
cheating by member firms.  This point has been lost in the literature on the JEC, which has tried 
to discern the characteristics of a successful cartel from the JEC experience.   
There are a few other treatments of cartel failure, in addition to MacAvoy's work.  Alexander's 
(1997) study of the 1930s pasta industry is an interesting case.  She argues that cost 
heterogeneity was sufficient to make it impossible for macaroni producers to collude, even 
during the NIRA, when many other U.S. industries were able to collude in the new, more 
sympathetic legal environment.  The optimal collusive price was very different for large firms 
with low costs than it was for smaller firms with higher costs.   
Levenstein (1995) examines repeated attempts by U.S. salt producers to collude during the 
nineteenth century.  Salt producers created the very first known price-fixing cartel in the U.S.  
They employed a wide variety of legal and extra-legal mechanisms to fix prices, limit output, 
and provide exclusive access to geographic markets.  Each of these collusive arrangements 
collapsed within a year or two at the most.  Levenstein argues that, despite much hard and 
creative work on the part of the manufacturers, as well as some state regulators, there were not 
sufficient barriers to entry to allow for sustainable collusion.  Clay and Troesken (2002) come to 
a similar conclusion regarding attempts to control the markets for distilled alcohol during the late 
nineteenth century: barriers to entry were simply too low to allow colluding firms to maintain 
market share as they increased price. 
3. Determinants of Cartel Profitability and Duration 
a. Concentration 
Virtually all studies of collusion include some measure of concentration.  Concentration has been 
shown to be consistently and positively related to collusive success.  Concentration may reflect 
barriers to entry.  But to the extent that concentration exhibits its own, independent effect on 
collusive success (as opposed to simply picking up the effect of barriers), it is probably because 
it is easier to design an agreement with fewer participants. Studies that find a positive 
relationship between collusion and concentration include Hay and Kelley (1974) and Eckbo 
(1976) (Table 1). 29  Most of the cartels included in our case study sample were in relatively 
                                                                 
29 The structure-conduct-performance and price-cost margin literature have found a consistent relationship between 
concentration and profits and/or markups across industries, but we restrict ourselves here to the literature on cartels.  
Rosenbaum and Manns (1994) for example, in their price-cost margin study of Fortune 500 corporations from 1974-
77, find that stable market concentration is the only variable that consistently makes conjectures more collusive.  
This stability may reflect the increased ease of coordination among a small number of firms in industries that are 
highly concentrated and/or whose membership does not fluctuate.  The stability of industry membership, however, 
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concentrated industries (see Table 10).  The exceptions are usually legal cartels, often with active 
state involvement. 
Some argue that the number of decision-makers is more important than the number of firms 
(Cyert, et al, 1995).  If the firm decentralizes pricing authority, then there is less price discipline 
and price wars are more likely to break out.  For example, in the famous electrical equipment 
conspiracy, Richard Austin Smith says that the 1950s “decentralization plan” (where the head of 
each unit was given marketing and pricing authority) lead to the breakdown of the cartel (Smith 
1963).  The number of participants in our set of case studies ranges from 2 to several hundred, as 
shown in Table 10.  But in each case where there were more than a dozen or so firms, industry 
associations or even national governments played a key role in organizing and implementing the 
agreement. 
b. Cheating 
Table 11 catalogs the causes of cartel “failures” as reported in our sample of case studies.  The 
most common cause of breakdown noted in Table 11 was entry; entry disrupted collusion at 
some point in over a third of the industries studied and was the primary cause of cartel disruption 
in a third of the individual episodes studied.30  That is larger than the figures given in Table 7 for 
cross-section studies, although it is close to Griffin’s 33% figure.  Non-market forces, such as the 
outbreak of WWI or WWII (15% of the cartels) and Department of Justice action (a little over 
10%) account for about a quarter of the dissolutions in the group.   
Trailing far behind are three cartel episodes, or less than 10% of the case study sample episodes, 
that ended due to cheating.  One interesting case regarding industry-specific demand fluctuations 
is the electrical equipment cartel. There was more cheating in the turbine agreement than in other 
electrical equipment products, because of the lumpiness of demand.  This is consistent with 
Stigler’s comment on the importance of large customers.  Where the defector can quickly capture 
a large share of the market with a small defection, defections are more likely.  This seems to 
have been the case in turbines, though it does not seem that it was sufficient to undermine the 
cartel altogether. 
In many industries, authors asserted that cheating was simply not a problem for the cartel.  
Bargaining problems were much more likely to undermine collusion than was secret cheating. 
About one quarter of the cartel episodes ended because of bargaining problems.  Bargaining 
issues affected virtually every industry studied.  Finding a point on the contract curve, and 
hoping that that point remains an equilibrium, is often the biggest challenge for firms attempting 
to collude.  Successful cartels have developed organizational designs that allow the agreement to 
accommodate fluctuations in the external environment without requiring costly renegotiations.  
Secret cheating undermines cartels in some industries, but if collusion is really to be successful, 
the firms in the industry will probably have to make such a significant investment in the 
collusive organization and in the development of organizational skills that cheating becomes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
also suggests that there are barriers to entry that allow the cartel to flourish.  What these barriers are may well vary 
from one industry to another. 
30 Baker (1995) argues that new entry is particularly important in cartelized industries because incumbent firms are 
less likely to adopt new innovations than are new entrants.  Thus entry is induced not only by high cartel profits but 
also by the incumbents’ neglect of potentially profitable innovations. 
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secondary issue.  Industries that continue to suffer from cheating after making such formal 
agreements are often industries that cannot really sustain collusion.  Of course, the story  of the 
modern industrial organization literature is that firms do not actually cheat; their competitors 
cannot discern that due to noise in the economic environment.  The costliness of many of the 
hypothesized punishments is such that successful colluders would rather invest in mechanisms to 
assure that cheating is observable, and therefore prevent it, than to implement costly punishments 
because of ex-post uncertainty. 
c. Customers and the Nature of Demand  
The case study literature also reflects the surprisingly complex relationship between customers 
and supplier cartels.  Table 12 summarizes the role of customers in the sample of case studies 
surveyed.  In five of these industries, customers engaged in explicit strategic behavior to try to 
break the cartel that charged them high prices.  In some cases (e.g., bromine and potash) 
customers attempted to enter the industry, vertically integrating to get around the cartel.  In other 
cases, customers attempted to encourage defections by telling suppliers that others already had 
(as in the rayon industry) or by contracting with defectors, as predicted by Stigler (Eswaran 
1997, Levenstein 2000).  Recent research on the potash cartel suggests that fertilizer 
manufacturers organized a national merger in order to undermine the potash cartel that supplied 
them with an essential raw material (Levenstein 2000).  Some customers also looked to legal 
remedies, even before the Sherman Act offered triple damages, as when crude oil producers had 
the corporate charter of an early railroad cartel revoked (Granitz and Klein 1996).  In virtually 
every case, large customers happily took advantage of price wars to stock up on supplies 
(Levenstein 1996).  For example, grain brokers actually stored their goods in Chicago waiting for 
the next breakdown in the JEC railroad cartel (Ulen 1979). 
But as seems so often to be the case in studying cartels, large customers are bad for cartel 
stability – unless they aren’t.  There are other cases, sometimes in the same industries as those 
described above, in which customers were intimately involved in stabilizing a cartel, providing 
information and punishment mechanisms not otherwise available and sharing, indirectly, in 
cartel rents (Granitz and Klein 1996, Levenstein July 1993).  Barbezat (1994) argues that steel 
users preferred the stability assured by the German steel cartel to the chaos of the competitive 
market. In many of these cases, the preferred treatment received by the cooperating customer 
gave them a significant advantage relative to their own competitors: better to pay somewhat 
higher input prices, and rid oneself of competitors who would have to pay even higher prices; 
better to pay higher input prices than charge competitive ones.  
As demand is more elastic, the potential for increasing profits decreases and so does the 
incentive to create a cartel (Pindyck 1979).   Where tested, this fairly intuitive result is borne out 
in the cross-sectional studies discussed above.  Eckbo (1976) finds that cartels are able to raise 
price substantially only if demand is sufficiently inelastic and there are few short-term substitutes 
(p. 42).  There are numerical estimates of demand elasticities for only four of the sixteen 
industries included in our informal sample of case studies (Table 13); in most cases measured 
demand is inelastic.  In five other cases, demand for the product is described as “inelastic.”  The 
one industry included that clearly had very elastic demand (the brewing industry, with an 
elasticity of –10), also had a remarkably unsuccessful cartel, with price wars occurring in every 
year of the study.  The prices charged by that particular cartel may have, in fact, been higher than 
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optimal, moving demand out to a very elastic range, because the cartel was operating in the 
immediate post-Prohibition era and there was significant political pressure to keep the price of 
alcoholic beverages high. 
The longstanding presumption in the cartel literature has been that cyclical downturns undermine 
cartels.  This was the case in the tin and steel cartels that fell apart during the depression of the 
early 1890s (Lamoreaux 1985).  Table 14 summarizes the evidence on cyclicality and cartel 
stability that could be culled from our sample of case studies.  The table asks whether a particular 
cartel ever came together or fell apart in response to demand fluctuations.  Many studies report 
that a cartel came together during a period of falling prices, but this is not always, or even 
usually, associated with falling demand (either for the particular product or in aggregate).  
Instead, it often signifies entry or the integration of previously distinct markets.  The limited 
information in this table reflects the limited contribution of case study research, up to this point, 
in informing our understanding of the relationship between cyclicality and cartel stability.  The 
only case that was ended by an observable demand shock is that of the international steel cartel.  
In other cases, bargaining issues may arise as a result of a decline in demand.  Similarly, it may 
be that cases that we have coded as cheating were adversely affected by demand shocks.   
What is most striking about this is how little relevance macroeconomic fluctuations seem to have 
one way or the other.  This is consistent with the Green-Porter/Abreu, et al literature, which 
implies that firms will respond to unobserved fluctuations in demand, but not to observed 
fluctuations.  From the point of view of the cartel, macroeconomic fluctuations are close to 
common knowledge; it is idiosyncratic demand that may not be observed.  It is also consistent, 
however, with our comments on expensive, disruptive punishments.  Successful cartels do not 
break apart, but rather develop machinery of some sort that allows them to weather cyclical 
fluctuations.  Cartels that are disrupted by observed cyclical fluctuations may be fairly fragile to 
begin with. 
d. Cartel Organization  
Cross-sectional studies have a difficult time testing the importance of organizational issues, 
because, even if it is possible to get data on cartel organizations for a large number of industries, 
that data has to be drastically simplified in order to be made use of in such a study.  Case studies 
offer more promise in this area, though most do not address the question directly.  One exception 
is MacKie-Mason and Pindyck (1987); they argue that organizational issues were not important 
in determining cartel success.  External conditions, not organizational issues, undermined the 
sulfur and mercury cartels; more generally, they argue that if sufficient profits are available, 
organizational means will be found.  But they do not examine the internal records of the cartels 
involved, so it is difficult to know whether a different cartel organization could have created 
barriers to entry or sustained demand, so that the cartel could have enjoyed continued success.  
One example of a cartel that has managed to do exactly that is the diamond cartel (Spar1994).   
Baker and Faulkner (1993) argue that organizational structure did matter for the success of the 
electrical equipment cartel of the 1950s: collusion was easier for standardized products in which 
the management of the cartel could be fairly decentralized.  It was much more difficult for 
customized products that required frequent contact among colluding firms.  But this case 
highlights the difficulty of treating organization as an exogenous variable.  The same firms with 
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essentially the same managers used very different organizations, but that was because of 
differences in the homogeneity of their products.  Thus one suspects that standardization and the 
smoothness of demand were the real determinants of cartel stability, more so than organization 
per se. 
The expectations that participants have about competitors’ propensity to cooperate can make all 
the difference in whether collusion is successful or not.  These expectations may be influenced 
by previous interaction or interaction in other markets.  These may also be influenced by culture, 
either cultural bonds that make negotiations easier or cultural differences that must be overcome.  
The large number of international cartels, historically and more recently, suggests that firms have 
managed, at least in some cases, to overcome such barriers in the search for higher profits.  But 
while a wide range of literatures, from the oldest cartel studies to modern supergame models of 
collusion, highlight the importance of such issues, they have rarely been systematically studied.  
They are not explicitly included in any of the cross-sectional studies discussed in Section II, 
above.   
Case studies have the potential to provide a forum for further examining such expectation issues, 
but moving from casual description to testing is rare and difficult. Spar (1994) examines how the 
internal organization of competitors can affect their capacity for external cooperation.  At the 
core are the dual problems of commitment and credibility.  She argues that these are critical 
determinants of cartel success.  Her study describes the historical background in which 
individualist diamond miners were forced to develop cooperative solutions to a variety of 
problems and argues that this created the context for successful collusion in the industry.  Studies 
of the rayon industry note that there was a “culture of collusion” among firms in the industry that 
facilitated cooperation (Gallet and Schroeter 1995, Markham 1952). Similarly, the 1930s steel 
industry benefited from the experience of the Gary dinners of the 1890s (Baker 1989).  
Alexander’s (1994) piece does perhaps the best job of moving the analysis forward by examining 
how the opportunity to cooperate during the National Industrial Recovery Act increased the 
potential for implicit collusion after its overturning by the Supreme Court.  Something had 
changed that allowed firms to move to a more profitable equilibrium as a result of that 
experience.31 
Section IV: Cartels in the 1990s 
In this section we discuss the duration and success of a set of more recent and less well-studied 
cartels: international cartels during the 1990s.  It is impossible to gauge the true number of 
international cartels in existence in the 1990s.  However, we do know that the U.S. Department 
of Justice and the European Commission have recently investigated and prosecuted, or are 
currently investigating, at least forty different international price-fixing conspiracies that were in 
force at some point in the past decade.  The surge in U.S. prosecutions of international cartels 
stems primarily from the revision and expansion of the Antitrust Division’s corporate amnesty 
program in 1993.  The number of corporations coming forward and seeking amnesty rose from 
                                                                 
31Polodny and Scott Morton (1999) provides an excellent example of how to directly examine the role of cultural 
bonds in sustaining a cartel.  The question they address is how the response of the cartel to a new entrant depends on 
cultural bonds, but it is a very similar question to the one raised here.  See Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) for a non-
cartel example of firms using the NIRA to move an industry to a more profitable equilibrium.   
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roughly one corporation per year to one per month.32  On the heels of this increased enforcement 
by the U.S., the European Union, as well as some non-European countries, have strengthened 
their anti-cartel laws and stepped up their enforcement.33  
The United States and the European Commission have successfully prosecuted thirty-five 
international cartels for fixing prices during the 1990s (Table 15).34  This sample, like its 
intellectual antecedents discussed in Section II, may be biased as a result of its dependency on 
prosecution as a sample selection criterion.  The producers in these cartels come almost 
exclusively from industrialized, OECD countries.  Many of these conspiracies appear to have 
had primarily U.S. or EU effects, but some of the larger cartels clearly had an effect on markets 
worldwide (Levenstein and Suslow 2001). 
1. Cartel Profitability 
We have very little evidence on the excess profits earned as a result of these episodes of 
cartelization.  For fifteen of the thirty-five cartels we have anecdotal evidence of price increases 
during the cartel periods, mostly from the trade press.35  The reported price increases range from 
10 percent to 100 percent, with a median cartel price increase of approximately 25 percent.  One 
can also see from Table 15 that the typical market was highly concentrated.  Although the 
concentration figures are hard to summarize, since they differ according to geographic region 
(U.S., Europe, or world) and the number of firms, a very rough calculation shows that the 
median market concentration, ranging from a two- to a ten-firm concentration ratio, is 83 
percent. 
The graphite electrodes cartel fits the pattern of a highly concentrated industry that allegedly 
raised prices significantly over a five-year period.  Graphite electrodes are large carbon columns 
used by electric arc furnaces or “mini-mills” in the making of steel.  These mini-mills use 
graphite electrodes to generate the enormous heat necessary to melt scrap metal and convert it 
back into a marketable steel product.  UCAR International of the United States and SGL Carbon 
Corporation of Germany dominate the market, with a combined world market share of about 
two-thirds.  Roughly five firms make up the bulk of the remaining market share.  In the United 
States, graphite electrode prices increased over fifty percent during the cartel period, May 1992 
                                                                 
32 Bingaman (1996, p. 8).  See also Adler and Laing (1997), who state, for example, that “In 1991, only 1 percent of 
corporate defendants were foreign and no foreign individuals were charged that year.  From July 1996 to January 
1997, 20 percent of all corporations and 27 percent of all individuals charged were foreigners” (p. 1). 
33 See, for example. Reynolds, Michael, “EU Briefings,” International Financial Law Review, London, January 1, 
1999, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 48+.  The article announces the decision within the European Commission to create a new 
unit to fight cartel activity.  See Evenett and Suslow (2000) and Evenett, Levenstein, and Suslow (2001) for further 
discussion of this sample of 1990s cartels. 
34 In order to be included in this sample, a cartel must satisfy the following conditions:  1) it must involve more than 
one producer; 2) it must include firms from more than one country; and 3) it must have attempted to set prices or 
divide up markets. 
35 Of course, evidence of increased cartel prices must be interpreted with care because some portion of the increase 
may reflect other factors such as rising raw materials costs or increases in demand.  The information in Table 15 is 
purely descriptive and does not purport to control for other relevant factors that may have affected prices during the 
conspiracy period.  Also, we do not know what the competitive price would have been “but for” the cartel. 
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through February 1997.36  In Canada, where the industry consists of only two firms with a 
combined market share of over 90 percent, prices rose by more than 90 percent over 1992-97.37  
The most precise estimates of cartel overcharges for a recent international cartel come from the 
economists who worked on the first lysine cartel case – a federal class-action suit in 1996.  The 
lysine conspiracy was precipitated by Archer Daniels’ Midland’s large-scale entry into the 
industry in 1991.  Lysine prices plummeted.  After securing roughly one-third global market 
share, ADM signaled that it was willing to behave cooperatively.38  There were 25 cartel 
meetings between 1992 and 1995.  In 1995 the Department of Justice was investigating the 
lysine case but had not yet filed formal charges.  However, lysine customers brought a number of 
private civil suits, which were consolidated into a federal class-action suit in 1996.  The 
defendant companies settled for $45 million. 
The government’s expert, John Connor, estimates that the cartel overcharged U.S. customers 
between $65 million and $134 million.39  The reasons for such a wide range in this estimate are 
by now familiar ones.  As we argued earlier, it is quite tricky to determine whether cartels are 
stable or recurring and the exact time frame during which a cartel was successfully operating.  In 
addition, there are always competing explanations for price increases, which may have occurred 
regardless of any cartel activity.  In the lysine case, the primary competing explanation was 
seasonality of demand.  Connor estimates that one-fourth of the 1992 price increase could be 
attributed to seasonality.40   
The timing of the dates of the lysine cartel was problematic, and there was considerable 
disagreement between the economic experts on each side.  Connor writes that there was 
“[d]isagreement about the dates of the conspiracy-effects period, the but-for price, and the type 
of industry conduct absent collusion…”41  Connor uses marginal cost (estimated from what he 
identifies as “highly competitive” periods) as the competitive price.  White, on the other hand, 
argues that the lysine industry, absent cooperation, would not have operated as a perfectly 
competitive industry.  It was a four-firm oligopoly that would have likely been able to engage in 
some form of implicit coordination if there had been no explicit meetings.42  
Recognition of this possibility, White argues, causes us to “enter the world of oligopoly 
speculation.”43  Perhaps ADM would have operated as a dominant firm.  Or, perhaps the firms 
would have adopted Cournot behavior.  White then identifies a shorter, 17-19 month, period as 
the best estimate of the true (i.e., effective) conspiracy period.  He concludes that “[t]hough the 
                                                                 
36 “Government's Sentencing Memorandum and Government's Motion for a Guidelines Downward Departure 
(U.S.S.G. §5K1.1)” U.S. Department of Justice, Filed October 19, 1999 (2001), p. 2. 
37 "Foreign Corporation Fined $12.5 million for Price Fixing," Industry Canada, Competition Bureau, News Release, 
July 20, 2000. 
38 Connor (2001), pp.  8-9. 
39 Connor (2001), p. 20. 
40 Connor (2001), p. 10. 
41 Connor (2001), p. 15. 
42 White (2001), pp. 27-28.  From a pro-active policy perspective, the relevant question is what is necessary to 
achieve a competitive price that assures an efficient allocation of producers’ resources and individual consumption 
decisions.  Thus, for our purposes, the marginal cost price is the relevant comparison. 
43 White (2001), p. 28. 
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conspiracy surely did have harmful effects on the purchasers of lysine, those effects were less 
extensive and less severe than was claimed.”44 
2. Cartel Duration 
The story on duration is quite the same as with other samples of cartel activity we have examined 
thus far.  The average duration of the sample of 1990s cartels listed in Table 15 is approximately 
5.4 years, with a standard deviation of 4.7.  There are short-lived cartels, such as aluminum 
phosphide, where the price-fixing effort lasted only from January to November of 1990.  In this 
case, one of the major producers refused to cooperate to raise prices and the conspiracy quickly 
collapsed.  Other short-lived cartels include plastic dinnerware, sodium gluconate, and thermal 
fax paper.  On the other hand, as with previous cartel samples, there is evidence of long-lived 
cartel activity as well:  cartonboard (1986-1991), graphite electrodes (1992-1997), maltol (1989-
1995), and sorbates (1979-1997), to name just a few.   
3. Determinants of Cartel Profitability and Duration 
Careful study of the characteristics of the industries cartelized during the 1990s has yet to be 
done.  In most cases, however, the industries are highly concentrated with a few very large multi-
national firms that compete with one another in many geographical and product markets.  In the 
few cases where the industry is not highly concentrated, such as shipping, industry associations 
have played a critical role in organizing and maintaining the cartel. 
There is no systematic study to date of whether these cartels used different mechanisms of 
organization, communication, and penalties than did their predecessors.  There have been claims 
that “international cartels use increasingly sophisticated techniques and technology to coordinate 
their activities…”45  Much more research needs to be done to verify this statement and interpret 
the details.  On the surface, the methods of organization and operation give the impression of 
remarkable similarity to those used historically.  For example, most of these cartels held 
meetings in hotel rooms around the world.  Despite new technologies of communication, the 
executives seem to have decided that true cartel negotiations – covering quotas, exchange of 
information, and threats of punishments – had to be done face-to-face.  Another similar 
characteristic is that markets were often divided geographically, much as they were in the 
international cartels active prior to World War II.  James Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division, makes this point when introducing the information contained on a 
series of covert tapes made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the lysine cartel meetings: 
“While the lysine tapes are extraordinary in the sense that they give us an insider’s 
view of the inner workings of an international cartel, the cartel itself is far from 
extraordinary.  The objectives of the lysine cartel and the methods the conspirators 
used are common among the international cartels that we have detected in the last few 
years.  At their core, international cartels have essentially the same purpose – to 
increase profits among the conspirators by carving up world markets – and they 
operate pursuant to the same methods – fixing prices, rigging bids, allocating 
                                                                 
44 White (2001), p. 30. 
45 Bingaman (1996), p. 1. 
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territories and customers, and allocating sales volumes among the conspirator firms 
on a worldwide basis.” 46 
Another well-documented example comes from the citric acid case, where firms in the industry 
fixed prices from approximately July 1991 to June 1995.47  The structure put in place by the 
citric acid cartel members was quite elaborate.  The senior executives responsible for 
determining the broad outline of the cartel agreement were nicknamed “the masters.”  The lower-
level executives responsible for the day-to-day workings of the cartel were “the sherpas.”  They 
shared monthly sales figures and took stock at the end of the year of each company’s total sales.  
A company selling more than its quota was required the next year to purchase citric acid from a 
cartel member that was under quota.48  This type of elaborate structure is no different in 
philosophy from the intricate structure developed by, for example, the electrical equipment 
manufacturers in the United States in the 1950s (famous for its “phases of the moon” bidding 
scheme). 
It is predictable that if firms attempt to fix prices and maintain cartel profitability, they must 
block entry into the industry.  Even a cursory study of recent international cartels shows that 
these firms have used and will use all available means to create barriers to entry.  The U.S. citric 
acid producers tried twice to employ the government to help protect the domestic industry from 
Chinese imports.  First, in 1995, while the cartel was still intact, producers lobbied the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative to include citric acid on the list of various Chinese imports to be 
hit with a high tariff.  A last-minute agreement prevented the sanctions from being imposed.49  
The second anti-dumping allegation was brought in 1999.  The International Trade Commission 
dismissed the case in February of 2000, after deciding that there was no material injury.50   
The graphite electrodes conspiracy also displays familiar structural characteristics, organizational 
mechanisms, and strategic behavior.  First, the global market is highly concentrated, with two 
major global firms holding the bulk of the market.  Second, barriers to entry are high – it takes 
roughly four years to build a new plant, and, according to industry sources, there has been no 
new entry since 1950.51  The cartel members agreed, among other things, to divide the world 
market share and designate a price leader in each region, reduce exports to members’ home 
markets, restrict capacity, exchange sales and customer information, and issue price 
announcements and price quotations in accordance with the agreement.52  According to reports in 
the press, the cartel investigation began after a complaint from a steel manufacturer.53  This is 
                                                                 
46 Griffin, James M., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, “An Inside 
Look At A Cartel At Work:  Common Characteristics of International Cartels,” Speech given to the American Bar 
Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 48th Annual Spring Meeting, April 6, 2000, p. 2. 
47 “Justice Department’s Ongoing Probe Into the Food and Feed Additives Yields Second Largest Fine Ever,” U.S. 
Department of Justice Press Release, January 29, 1997. 
48 Kurt Eichenwald “U.S. Wins A Round Against Cartel,” New York Times, January 30, 1997. 
49 Cheryl Cullinan Lewis, “Citric Acid,” Purchasing, May 4, 1995. 
50 Clay Boswell, “Pucker Up: A Taste for Tartness Drives Acidulants,” Chemical Marketing Reporter, May 29, 
2000. 
51 Levenstein and Suslow (2001), p. 33. 
52 A listing of the charges is given in “Government's Sentencing Memorandum and Government's Motion for a 
Guidelines Downward Departure (U.S.S.G. §5K1.1)” U.S. Department of Justice, Filed October 19, 1999. 
53 Adam Jones, "Blowing the Whistle - American-Style," The Times, February 24, 2000. 
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one of the few cases where the presence of a large customer does appear to have destabilized a 
modern cartel, albeit through a different mechanism than Stigler hypothesized. 
Contrary to Stigler, this sample of international cartels suggests that successful collusion is 
possible in industries with large customers (see Table 15).  Many of these cartels sold 
intermediate goods to large, concentrated industries.  For example, citric acid producers sold to 
Mars, Coca-Cola, and Proctor and Gamble while the vitamin cartel was selling to Kellogg, 
Quaker Oats, and Tyson.  In fact, slightly less than half of the price-fixing cases in Table 15 
(where we could find relevant information) had large corporate customers whose purchasing 
offices presumably had both knowledge and bargaining power on their side when ordering 
inputs.  These firms may have used their bargaining power to lower their input prices, but they 
seem not to have used their resources to break up these cartels.  Of these 35 anti-trust cases, four 
were initiated by customers filing civil suits, but in each case the customers were small firms or 
individuals.  Triple damages were not enough to catch the attention of the legal staffs of these 
large corporate purchasers prior to government action.  They have, however, been willing to 
demand compensation for damages after the government had broken up the cartel; there were 
seven civil suits filed against cartels with large customers after the government filed suit.   
This indicates that the impact of large customers on cartel stability may be more complex than 
Stigler suggests.  Some of these downstream industries may have been sufficiently oligopolistic 
themselves that it was possible for them to pass along higher input prices to consumers, 
decreasing any incentive they might otherwise have to disrupt the upstream cartel.  Thus 
customer size, in and of itself, may destabilize the upstream cartel, but customer concentration 
may have the opposite effect. 
Section V.  Conclusion 
What determines cartel success?  Part of the difficulty in studying cartel success is that it 
depends on a wide variety of variables, and these variables are often not independent of one 
another.  These include traditional structural variables, such as the variance in and concentration 
of demand, the structure and homogeneity of costs, and the rate of technological change.  Cartel 
success also depends on organizational factors, such as the distribution of power within the 
cartel, its voting structure, the sophistication of mechanisms for detecting and deterring cheating, 
and the ability of the cartel itself to create barriers to entry.  Cartel success depends as well on 
factors that are exogenous to the particular industry, such as government regulation and anti-trust 
enforcement.  Finally, cartel success depends on such idiosyncratic and history-dependent 
determinants as how quickly the organization learns about cartel design, the start-up costs of 
creating the cartel, and the reputation of cartel members.  It is easy to see that none of these 
variables functions independently.  Start-up costs are lower and punishment devices more 
sophisticated in a more accommodating legal environment than one with vigorous anti-trust 
enforcement.  Cartels can easily create barriers to entry in some industries, but fail repeatedly to 
do so in others, despite similar organizational and managerial skills. 
What is the best way to study cartels?  If the best answer to the question “What determines cartel 
success?” is that it is primarily exogenous factors, such as anti-trust enforcement, or demand and 
cost parameters, then cross-sectional studies should be informative.  If, on the other hand, 
idiosyncratic determinants such as managerial strategy and cartel design are the predominant 
 24 
factors influencing cartel success, then industry-specific studies are necessary.  Case studies may 
also help to illuminate the ways that individual cartels have influenced “exogenous” variables 
such as anti-trust policy or market demand (for example, by lobbying or advertising). 
There is an important complementarity between case study and cross-sectional analysis of 
cartels. As we have argued, it is crucial to distinguish successful from unsuccessful cartels.  Case 
study analysis is necessary to determine the level of success (or lack thereof) of any individual 
cartel.  But with a sufficient number of such studies upon which to draw, cross-sectional analysis 
could improve our understanding of the determinants of successful collusion beyond what is ever 
possible when examining one, by definition idiosyncratic, case at a time.  
When we recognize that both external and internal factors and the relationship between them 
matter for cartel stability, we can see that despite the flowering of the empirical cartel literature 
in recent years, there is much fruitful work still to be done. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF CARTEL CHARACTERISTICS: 
U.S. CROSS-SECTION STUDIES 
 
Author 
 Hay & Kelley Fraas & Greer Posner 
Number of 
Observations 
65 606 989 
Sample 
DOJ convictions for covert 
horizontal price fixing 
between 1963 and 1972 
DOJ convictions for price 
fixing between 1910 and 
1972 
DOJ horizontal 
conspiracies, 1890-1969 
Unit of Observation Cartel Cartel Cartel 
Cartel Characteristics 
Mean Number of 
Firms in Conspiracy 
7.25a 16.7 29.1b 
Median Number of 
Firms in Conspiracy 
7 8 Between 6 and 10 
Fewer than 10 cartel 
members 
79% 60% 64% 
Average C-4 Ratio 77%  “large proportion … in 
industries not normally 
regarded as highly 
concentrated” 
Trade Association 
Involvement 
29% 36% 44% 
Product Homogeneity “High”   
Ratio of Fixed to 
Marginal Cost 
“No pattern”   
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 Hay & Kelley Fraas & Greer Posner 
Social structure “Dominant individuals” can 
facilitate cooperation 
  
Bid rigging 29% 19% 14% 
Patent   10% 10% 
Government customer 14%  At least 7% 
Market allocationc 35% 26% 26% 
Single sales agent  3% 6% 
Terms & conditions of 
sales set 
14% 5% 14% 
Disciplinary or 
coercive practices; 
exclusion 
5% 12%  
Policing; fines; audits   4% 
 
Notes: 
a  Excluding four cases with 50 or more conspirators. 
b  The mean number of firms for all horizontal conspiracies in Posner’s sample is 29.1, but the average falls to 19.9 if one 
omits the cases brought between 1920 and 1934.  The average number of conspirators that Posner reports for those years is as 
follows:  1920-24: 53; 1926-29: 95; 1930-34: 56.  
c  Market allocation includes use of production quotas, division of markets, division of territories, allocation of 
customers. 
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TABLE 2 
CARTEL DURATION: 
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL CROSS-SECTION STUDIES 
 
 Eckbo –   
Sample 1a 
Eckbo –   
Sample 2a 
Griffin/ 
Marquez 
Suslow Posner Dick 
Average 
Duration 
(years) 
3.8c 4.6 c 7.3 3.7 e 7.5 f 5.3 g 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Duration 
2.4 4.7 6.3 3.0   
Duration Range 1 –18 0 – 18d 1 – 29 1 – 13   
% less than 5 
years 
60% 57% 43% 40%  39% 
% 10 or more 
years 
12% 18% 32% 37%  24% 
Notes: 
a  Eckbo splits his sample into two sub-samples, depending on data availability.  In Sample 1, Eckbo is able to measure 
seventeen dimensions of cartel and market characteristics.  For Sample 2, he can measure only five dimensions.  There 
seems to be a mistake in Eckbo’s Table 3-3 on p. 37.  Included in that table is an iodine cartel lasting sixty-one years.  
However, the averages he presents later regarding cartel length are correct only if the iodine cartel is taken out of the 
calculations.  (Also, it would make the number of observations 52 rather than 51.)  The calculations in the above table for 
Sample 2 do not include the iodine cartel. 
b  Marquez uses Griffin’s sample, omitting two cartel episodes (Griffin has 54 episodes and Marquez has 52).  The means 
and standard deviations reported in the two papers are therefore extremely similar, but not identical. 
c  Eckbo defines “efficient” cartels as those able to “raise price 200% above the unit cost of production and distribution” 
(Eckbo 1976, p. 26).  Average duration for efficient Sample 1 cartels is 5 years, for inefficient Sample 1 cartels it is 3.1 
years.  For Sample 2 cartels, the efficient episodes lasted 8 years on average while the inefficient episodes lasted only 2.7.  
d   There are several cartel episodes in Sample 2 that lasted less than a year, which Eckbo codes as “0” in length. 
e  The mean duration of all cartel episodes is 8.3 years with a standard deviation of 6.2 years.  The mean duration of the 28 
uncensored cartel episodes is 3.7 years with a standard deviation of 3 years.  
f  The average duration statistics are given in Posner’s Table 25 only for cases from 1950-69.   
g  Dick states that “the median Webb-Pomerene cartel remained active for approximately 5.3 years” (p. 251).  In footnote 
28 on p. 251 he says that the “average cartel survived at least until year 5 with a 51.7 percent probability and at least until 
year 6 with a 45.8 percent probability.  I assume a uniform distribution of cartel exists between these two duration to 
interpolate a median duration of 5.3 years.” The median duration of non-censored episodes is 5.3 years.  Dick also reports 
that the median life span among cartels organized as common sales agencies was roughly 4.5 years, compared to 7.4 years 
for cartels (for example, joint advertising export cartels) whose members shipped individually (p. 256).  We suspect that 
this might be because the non-sales agency “cartels” were not actually colluding to fix prices and therefore did not face the 
same threats to their stability. 
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TABLE 3 
EPISODIC CARTELS: 
EXAMPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL CARTEL CROSS-SECTION STUDIES 
 
Industry Length of Cartel Episodes  
(years) 
Author 
Aluminum 5 1901 2 1906 2 1912 3 1923 4 1929 5 1931  Eckbo 
Coffee 1 1957 1 1958 3 1959     Eckbo 
Copper 2 1888 4 1918 6 1926 4 1935 19 1968   Griffin 
Steel 4 1926 0.5 1930 0.17 1931 6 1933    Eckbo 
Sugar 2 1926 4 1931 2 1937 2 1959 5 1968 3 1974 3 1978 Griffin 
Sugar 0 1864 10 1902 0 1929 0 1942 0 1953 0 1956 0 1958 Eckbo 
Sulfur 3 1907 10 1922 5 1934 11 1947    Griffin 
Tin 2 1929 3 1931 2 1935     Eckbo 
 
Notes: 
The beginning dates of each cartel episode are shown in superscript. 
 
 
 35 
TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF CARTEL SUCCESS: 
INTERNATIONAL CROSS-SECTION STUDIES 
 
 Eckbo – Sample 1 Eckbo – Sample 2 Griffin 
Number of 
Observations 
23 28a 22 industries 
54 episodes 
Dependent Variable Efficient / Inefficient 
9  /  14 
Efficient / Inefficient 
10  /  18 
Lerner Index 
Avg =0.3, Range=(-0.1, 0.8) 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Mean Sample Mean Sign of Regression 
Coefficient 
Cartel 
Concentration/ 
Herfindahl 
0.9  /  0.36 
(1 =  C4 > 50%) 
1.6 /  0.55 
(2 = C4 > 75%,  
1 = C4 Î (50%, 75%)) 
 
Cartel Market Share 0.9  /  1.14 
1 if (50%, 75%), 2 if > 75% 
2  /  1.2 Positive* 
Demand Elasticity 0.22  /  0.06 
(1 = elastic) 
 Positive 
Social structure/ 
Organization 
  Positive* 
(index from 1-10) 
Cartel Heterogeneity 
(Cost or size) 
0.9 /  0.58 
(1 = high cost member 
produces at a cost no larger 
than 50% above low-cost 
member) 
 Negative 
Government 
involved 
0.12/ 0.58 
(1 = yes) 
  
 36 
 Eckbo – Sample 1 Eckbo – Sample 2 Griffin 
Short-term 
substitution 
0.22 / 0.43 
(1 = short-term  
substitutes exist) 
  
Long-term 
substitution 
0.77 /  0.43 
(1 = long-term  
substitutes exist) 
  
 
Notes: 
*  = statistically significant as reported by author. 
a  See Appendix A for details on the size of Eckbo’s Sample 2. 
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TABLE 5 
DETERMINANTS OF CARTEL SUCCESS: 
U.S. CROSS-SECTION STUDIES 
 
 Fraas & Greer Asch & Senecaa  
Sample 
606 DOJ convictions for price 
fixing between 1910 and 1972 
and 1569 random manufacturing 
industries 
51 convicted price-fixers and 50 
randomly selected “non-
colluders” 
 Relationship Between Collusion and Industry Characteristics 
Number of Firms - insignificant 
Profit Rate  - 
Rate of Demand 
Growth 
 - 
Firm Size  + 
Producer Goods  + 
Variability of Profits  + 
Market Share  + 
Advertising Intensity  - 
Entry Barriers   - 
Concentration  + 
Patents -  
International market -  
Lumpiness of orders -  
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TABLE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF DURATION: 
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL CARTEL STUDIES 
 
Author Dick Marquez Suslow Posner Hay & Kelley 
Number of 
Observations 
93 industries 
111 episodes 
22 industries 
52 episodes 
45 industries 
71 episodes 
989 DOJ cases 62 DOJ cases 
Dependent Variablea 
Conditional 
probability of 
continued survival 
Duration Conditional 
probability of 
continued survival 
Duration Duration 
Independent 
Variable 
     
Number of Firms or 
Number of Countries 
Positive*  Negative Positivec Insignificantd 
Industry 
Concentration 
     Positivee 
Cartel Market Share Positive* Positive* Positive   
Cartel Concentration  Positive* , b    
Patent Involved   Positive*   
Government Involved   Negative   
Market Allocation   Negative* , f   
Joint Sales Agency Positive  Negative   
Penalties   Positive*   
Buyer size Negative*     
Demand Instability Negative*     
Rate of demand 
growth 
 Negative Negative*    
Business Cycle  Negative  
 
 Negative*   
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Author Dick Marquez Suslow Posner Hay & Kelley 
Anticipated Cycle  Negative*     
Unanticipated Cycle  Insignificant  Negative*   
Experience Positive*  Positive   
Age in Single 
Episode 
Positive* , g     
Cross-market 
Linkages 
Positive*     
Period of Activity 
Before WWII 
 Negative* , h     
Ended in 1939  Negative    
Interest Rate  Negative    
 
 
Notes: 
*  = statistically significant as reported by author. 
a  The actual dependent variable used in both Dick (1996) and Suslow (1991) is the conditional probability of failure.  
The dependent variable listed here is “conditional probability of continued survival” for ease of comparison with 
those studies using “duration” as their dependent variable.  For example, Dick reports a negative coefficient for 
cartel market share:  as market share increases there is a lower conditional probability of failure or a longer expected 
cartel duration.  Although the coefficient reported in his paper is negative, we list the sign as “Positive,” directly 
indicating an increase in cartel duration. 
b  Cartel concentration is measured as the Herfindahl index using each cartel member’s share of cartel output to capture 
“the concentration of economic power within the cartel” (Griffin 1989, p. 186). 
c  Posner compared number of conspirators with length of time between inception of conspiracy and filing of complaint.  
He found that of 79 cases with 10 or fewer firms, 52% persisted for 6 years or more.  Of the 28 cases involving more 
than 10 firms, 64% persisted 6 years or more. 
d  “Since most of the cases had ten or fewer conspirators the dispersion of observations was not great enough to allow 
any significant pattern to emerge” (Hay and Kelley 1974, p. 26). 
e  “…the preponderance of conspiracies lasting ten or more years were in markets with high degrees of concentration” 
(Hay and Kelley 1974, p. 26). 
f  Negative correlation if the cartel set production quotas.  Other measures (exclusive territories, export quotas) were 
positive but insignificant. 
g  Cartel in 10th year had 38-48% higher probability of dissolving than cartel in 5th year. 
h  Current cartel averaged three years shorter if cartel existed prior to WWII. 
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TABLE 7 
CAUSES OF CARTEL BREAKDOWNS: 
INTERNATIONAL CARTEL STUDIES 
 
Causes of Cartel Breakdown Eckbo – 
Sample 1 
Eckbo –   
Sample 2 
Griffina Suslow 
Cheating and Disagreement 43.5% 58.6% 33.3% 23.9% 
External Shock 30.4%  50.0%b 42.3% 
Entry and Substitutionb 26.1% 41.4% 33.3% 15.5% 
 Entry 13.0%c  25.9% 15.5% 
 Substitution 8.7%c  9.3%  
Technological Change   9.3%  
Antitrust Indic tment    18.3% 
TOTAL # EPISODES 23 29d 54 71 
 
Notes: 
a  This is based on both Griffin's discussion on pp. 198-99 and the information in his Table 4 (pp. 200-201). 
b  The sum of entry and substitution does not always add to the total because of under-classification in the case of 
Eckbo and double counting in the case of Griffin.  Eckbo categorizes six episodes, or 26.1% of the 23 observations 
in Sample 1, as breaking down due to either entry or substitution.  Of the six, 3 were due to entry, 2 to substitution, 
and 1 is unclassified. Two of Griffin’s cartels ended as a result of both substitution and entry.  
c  This over-states the significance of external shocks as we classify them in this paper.  Griffin groups together wars, 
antitrust and other governmental actions, and cartel reorganizations.  We cannot separately categorize the cartel 
reorganizations in his sample, but some of them may more properly be classified as asymmetric information or 
bargaining problems, which may or may not have resulted from an external shock. 
d  See Appendix A for a discussion of the size of Eckbo’s Sample 2. 
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TABLE 8 
CARTEL PRICES AND PROFITABILITY: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Price and Profitability Trends 
Beer Possibly above the monopoly level, due to political 
pressure to keep price high 
Bromine Close to joint-profit maximizing level in some periods; 
other collusive periods barely above Cournot price 
level 
Cement 10 percent above world price 
Diamonds Prices nearly doubled after initial formation of cartel 
Electrical Equipment  
Mercury Prices higher in first incarnation (1928-1950) than 
second (1954-1972) 
Ocean Shipping Close to joint-profit maximizing level 
Oil Prices sometimes approached import price (New York 
price plus tariff) 
Parcel Post  
Potash Prices rose following agreements; in 1910, prices were 
double “average cost” 
Railroad  
Railroad-Oil  
Rayon  
Steel Less than joint profit maximizing price, but one-third 
higher than world price 
Sugar Prices rose after cartel formation 
Tea Prices rose 80 percent in 1933 after cartel was re-
established 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 9 
CARTEL DURATION: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry First year of 
cartel a 
Average length 
of cooperation 
in industry 
Number of distinct 
episodes of 
cooperationb 
Maximum 
length of 
cooperation 
Minimum 
length of 
cooperation 
Beer 1933 9 years 1 9 years 9 years 
Bromine 1885 6.25 4 10 3 
Cement 1922 40 1 40 40 
Diamonds 1870s 60 2 100 20 
Electrical 
Equipment 
1950 8 1 8 8 
Mercury 1928 25 2 28 22 
Ocean shipping 1870s 51 3 54 50 
Oil 1871 2 3 3 1 
Parcel Post 1851 28.5 2 40 17 
Potash 1877 9.4 8 20 1 
Railroad 1875 3.8 6 8 1 
Railroad-Oil 1871 7 5 30 0 
Rayon 1932 8 1 8 8 
Steel 1926 7.25 4 13 4 
Sugar 1887 6.75 4 10 2 
Tea 1929 3.5 2 6 1 
 
Notes: 
a  The first year of the cartel is not necessarily the first year in which collusion was attempted or achieved in the 
industry.  It is simply the first year in the cartel case studies surveyed here.  
 
b  These indicate the number of distinct cartels, whose existence we can clearly date by drawing on the case studies 
surveyed here.  In these industries, there are clearly a larger number of agreements in distinct product markets and 
distinct regions than is suggested by this table. 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 10 
CONCENTRATION AND NUMBER OF FIRMS: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Number of Participants Concentration 
Beer 550 - 780 C1 = 4% 
Bromine 7 - 15  
Cement 4 C3 = 95% 
Diamonds  C1 declined from nearly 100% in 1880 to 80% in 1994 
Electrical 
Equipment 
40  
Mercury 2 countries; only 1 or 2 mines in each country C2 = 80% 
Ocean shipping 2-8 C2 = 50% in one South African 
market 
Oil 19-50  
Parcel Post 5 C5 nearly 100% 
Potash 3-30  
Railroad 3-15  
Railroad-Oil 3-4 C3 = 75% 
Rayon 2 C2 = 50% 
Steel 4-8 (countries and/or firms) US: C4=60%; C1=35% 
Sugar 8-19 C1 declined from 92% to 25%; 
C3 = 60% in 1927 
Tea 349 (3 countries) C4 > 20% 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 11 
CAUSES OF CARTEL BREAKDOWN: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Entry and Cartel’s Reactiona Secret 
Cheating 
War or  
Anti-Trust 
Prosecution 
Technological 
Change 
Other 
Bargaining 
Problems 
 Entry 
Occurred 
Disrupted 
Cartel 
Accom- 
modated 
by Cartel 
    
Beer    Yes Yes   
Bromine Yes No Yes Little Yes Yes Yes 
Cement No       
Diamonds Yes No Yes No   Yes 
Electrical 
Equipment 
   Yes, for 
turbines 
Yes   
Mercury Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Ocean 
shipping 
Yes Yes Yes No   Yes 
Oil Yes Yes Yes No    
Parcel Post Attempted Yes   Yes  Yes 
Potash Yes No Yes No Yes  Yes 
Railroad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Railroad-Oil Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Rayon     Yes   
Steel    In U.S. Yes   
Sugar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Tea Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: 
a  Entry indicates whether there was any entry during the period covered by the case study.  “Disrupted cartel” indicates that 
there were instances in which the cartel responded to entry with punitive or predatory behavior.  Entry which was followed 
by an invitation to join the cartel, but in which the firms could not reach a new distribution of quotas or rents, is classified as 
a bargaining problem, not an entry problem per se.  “Accommodated” indicates that there were instances in which a new 
entrant was invited to join the cartel without a disruption in cooperative pricing.  For the other columns, a “yes” indicates 
that such an event disrupted the cartel, not simply that it occurred.  For example, there was technological change in the oil 
industry during the period of study, but that technological change did not disrupt collusion. 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 12 
HOW DOES DOWNSTREAM STRUCTURE AFFECT CARTEL STABILITY?: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Customer 
Size 
Customer 
Concentration 
Customer 
participation 
in cartel 
Did customers try to 
destabilize cartel? 
Beer Small Low No No 
Bromine Medium High Yes Downstream 
pharmaceutical firms 
tried to integrate 
backward into 
bromine 
Cement Small Low Vertical 
Integration 
 
Diamonds Medium Low Yes  
Electrical 
Equipment 
Varied Low No  
Mercury     
Ocean 
shipping 
Varied Low No Yes, in tramp 
shipping & other 
geographic routes 
Oil   No  
Parcel Post Varied Low No  
Potash Increased 
over time 
Increased over 
time 
No Yes, attempted 
vertical integration, 
attempted to induce 
cheating 
Railroad Varied Low No Strategic shipping by 
customers 
Railroad-Oil Large High Yes Yes, crude producers 
had cartel charter 
revoked 
Rayon   No Customers spread 
rumors of cheating, to 
induce it 
Steel Large  Yes, in some 
cases 
Large customers 
bargained for lower 
prices than small 
customers received 
Sugar Varied  No No 
Tea   No No 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 13 
DEMAND ELASTICITY ESTIMATES: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Elasticity Estimate 
Beer -10.3 
Bromine -0.38 to – 3 
Cement Inelastic 
Diamonds Very inelastic 
Electrical 
Equipment 
 
Mercury -0.07 to –0.21 
Ocean shipping  
Oil Assumed to be inelastic 
Parcel Post  
Potash  
Railroad  
Railroad-Oil  
Rayon Elastic 
Steel Inelastic in long run; short run elasticity high 
Sugar Relatively inelastic 
Tea Low, especially at higher incomes (-0.32) 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 14 
HOW DOES DEMAND AFFECT THE FORMATION & ENDURANCE OF CARTELS?: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Formed 
during 
downturn 
Formed 
during 
upturn 
Broke up during 
downturn 
(observed?) 
Broke up 
during 
upturn 
(observed?) 
Industry 
cyclicality 
Beer Yes No Price war 
punishments in 
response to 
unobserved shocks 
 Counter-cyclical 
Bromine No No No No Low 
Cement     High 
Diamonds      
Electrical 
Equipment 
No    Varied across 
products 
Mercury No     
Ocean 
shipping 
No     
Oil No    High 
Parcel Post No     
Potash No     
Railroad No    High 
Railroad-Oil No    High 
Rayon Yes   Yes  
Steel Yes  Yes  High 
Sugar Yes    Counter-cyclical 
Tea Yes    Counter-cyclical 
 
See Appendix B for list of sources. 
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TABLE 15 
INTERNATIONAL PRICE-FIXING 
RECENT U.S. DOJ AND EC ACTIONS 
 
Industry 
Durationa 
(years) 
Measure of Market 
Concentrationb Measure of Price Increase
c Large 
customers?d 
Aluminum Phosphide < 1 U.S.: C4 = 90 48%  No 
Bromine Products 3 World: C3 = 76 N/A ? 
Cable-Stayed Bridges 1 N/A N/A No 
Carbon Cathode Block 2 N/A N/A ? 
Cartonboard 5 Europe:  C-Cartel= 80 20-26%  No 
Cement 11 Europe: C6 = 50 
Britain: C3 = 90 
France: C4 = 90 
N/A ? 
Citric Acid 4 U.S.: C4 = 100 
Europe: C5= 100 
1) 21-24% markup over marginal 
cost 
2) 50% price increase 
Yes 
Ferrosilicon Products 2 U.S.: Six major producers N/A Yes 
Ferry Operators 
(Adriatic Sea) 
7 N/A N/A No 
Ferry Operators 
(Cross-Channel Freight) 
< 1 C2 = 72 for cross-channel 
passenger market; same two 
firms were indicted in the 
cross-channel freight cartel 
10%  ? 
Fine Arts  6 C2 = 95 0 – 20% ? 
Graphite Electrodes 5 World: C2 = 67; 
U.S.: C5 = 94 
Canada: C2 = 90 
U.S.:  50% - 60%  
Canada:  90%  
Yes 
Isostatic Graphite 5 World:  6 major firms N/A  Yes 
Laminated Plastic Tubes 9 U.S.: C3 = 95 N/A ? 
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Industry 
Durationa 
(years) 
Measure of Market 
Concentrationb Measure of Price Increase
c Large 
customers?d 
Lysine 3 World: C3 = 95% in late 
1980’s (ADM began 
production in 1991 and by 
1996 had 47% world market 
share) 
Mexico: C2 = 90 
World:  41%  
U.S.:  67%: Estimated 
“overcharges” vary from $45 million 
up to $134 million 
Canada:  50% 
Yes 
Maltol 6 World: C2 = 80-90 N/A Yes 
Marine Construction 
Services 
4 N/A N/A Yes 
Marine Transportation 
Services  
5 N/A N/A ? 
Plastic Dinnerware 1 U.S.: C2 > 90 N/A Yes 
Shipping (Central West 
African) 
20 Shipping conference held 
more than 90% market share 
N/A ? 
Shipping (Far Eastern) 4 Shipping conference held 
80% share between northern 
Europe and the Far East 
N/A ? 
Shipping (France-
Central & West African) 
17 C4 = 90 34-39% ? 
Shipping (North 
Atlantic) 
2 1994: Cartel members had 
joint market share over 60% 
1995: Shipping conference 
held between 70-80% of the 
trans North-Atlantic 
container market 
Damages Estimate, 1995:  
Announced price increases in 1995 
“would have meant an additional 
cost to shippers of US$65 to $75 
million, when compared with 1994 
prices” 
Damages Estimate, 1994-98: Trans-
Atlantic Conference Agreement 
(TACA) cost European industry $1.8 
billion in extra shipping costs 
between 1994 and 1998 
? 
Sodium Erythorbate 2 C2 = 90 N/A Yes 
Sodium Gluconate 2 Cartel members were world’s 
major producers 
N/A Yes 
Sorbates 17 N/A 14% Yes 
Stainless Steel 1 World: C4 = 52 100% ? 
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Industry 
Durationa 
(years) 
Measure of Market 
Concentrationb Measure of Price Increase
c Large 
customers?d 
Steel Beam 6 Europe:  C10 = 66 N/A ? 
Steel Heating Pipes 4 Western Europe:  C6 = 91 10-20% No 
Steel Tube, Seamless 5 EC cartel share = 19% N/A ? 
Sugar 4 Great Britain: C2 = 90 N/A Yes 
Tampico Fiber 5 Cartel members had 
“overwhelming” share of the 
U.S. market 
N/A No 
Thermal Fax Paper 1 U.S.: C3 = 40-45 10% Yes 
Vitamins 9 World: C3 = 75 for bulk 
vitamins 
U.S.: 20% 
 Canada: 30% 
Yes 
Wastewater 
Construction  
8 Five large multinational 
construction companies  
One estimate of the markup in the 
bid for one contract was “at least 
$26.5 million” 
Yes 
 
Notes: 
 
The information presented in Table 15 on individual cartels was gathered from various industry and government 
sources including:  1)  The US Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov/atr); 2)  The European Court of Justice 
(http://europa.eu.int/cj); 3)  Industry and business newspapers and trade magazines, such as American Metal Market, 
Chemical Marketing Reporter, EU Business, European Business Week, International Cement Magazine, News Line, 
Oil and Gas Journal, Rocks and Mineral Market, Wall Street Journal. 
 
a  Duration is based on approximate conspiracy dates alleged in the government’s suit against the cartel.  Indictments 
of different firms may list different conspiracy dates, which are not reflected in this table.  
 
b  All concentration figures are approximate.  Wherever possible concentration measures date to the period of the 
cartel.  In other instances the figures date to the period immediately prior to or after the cartel.  Detailed references 
are available from the authors. 
 
c  All price increase measures are approximate.  Information is extremely sparse.  The price increase information 
usually refers to a selected period within the cartel years; it is not normally an indicator of the average price increase 
over the entire life of the cartel.  Detailed references are available from the authors.   
 
d  This is a rough indicator of whether the cartel sold to large firms.  We had no specific sales cutoff.   The indicator 
reflects solely whether the cartel sold to what we would be familiar with as a sizeable company.  Detailed references 
are available from the authors.  
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APPENDIX A 
Description of Data Sets Used in Cross-Section Cartel Studies 
 
 
Asch and Seneca (1975):  101 large U.S. manufacturing corporations, 1958 – 1967. 
 
Dick (1996):  93 industries with 111 Webb-Pomerene (U.S.) export cartels, 1918 – 1965. 
 
Eckbo (1976):  51 international cartels in 18 industries, 1819 – 1964.  (Sample 1 contains 23 
cartels measured on 17 dimensions, Sample 2 has 29 cartels measured on 5 dimensions.  There is 
a discrepancy between the text and the tables describing Sample 2.  Table 3-3 which lists the 
characteristics of the Sample 2 cartels has an entry for an Iodine cartel, bringing the total number 
of cartel episodes listed to 29.  In the text and in Table 3-5, however, Eckbo says that there are 
only 28 cartel episodes.) 
 
Fraas and Greer (1977):  606 cases of U.S. price fixing, 1910 – 1972. 
 
Great Britain Board of Trade (1944):  125 products surveyed (primarily manufacturing), pre-
World War II. 
 
Griffin (1989):  54 international cartels in 22 industries, 1888 – 1984. 
 
Hay and Kelley (1974):  Cases of U.S. price fixing, 1963 –1972. The article's appendix lists 110 
cases, but Hay and Kelley were not able to measure all of the desired industry characteristics for 
each case.  Of the 62 cases in their Table 2, for example, concentration ratios are available for 50 
cases.   
 
Marquez (1994):  52 international cartels in 22 industries, 1888 – 1984.  (Marquez uses Griffin's 
cartel sample, but excludes Copper V (i.e., the fifth cartel episode in copper) and Magnesium II.  
Marquez does comment on the omission.) 
 
Posner (1970):  1551 U.S. antitrust cases, 989 involving horizontal conspiracy, 1890 – 1969. 
 
Suslow (1991):  71 international manufacturing and commodity cartels episodes are 
distinguished for 45 industries, 1920 – 1939. 
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APPENDIX B 
SOURCES FOR SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
Industry Source 
Beer McGahan 1995. 
Bromine Levenstein 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998. 
Cement Leach 1994; Fourie and Smith 1994. 
Diamonds Spar1994. 
Electrical 
Equipment 
Baker and Faulkner 1993. 
Mercury MacKie-Mason and Pindyck 1987; Teece, Sunding and Mosakowski 1993. 
Ocean shipping Pirrong 1992; Polodny and Scott Morton 1999; Scott Morton 1997; Sjostrom 1989 
Oil Grant and Thille 2001. 
Parcel Post Grossman 1996. 
Potash Levenstein 2000, Schroter 1993. 
Railroad Ellison 1994;Berry and Briggs 1988; Briggs, 1996; Hudson, 1890; Porter 1983, 1985 
Railroad-Oil Granitz and Klein 1996. 
Rayon Eswaran 1997; Gallet and Schroeter 1995 
Steel Baker 1989; Barbezat 1989, 1990, 1994; Gallet 1997; Hughes and Barbezat 1996. 
Sugar Genesove and Mullin 1998, 1999. 
Tea Gupta 1997, 2001. 
 
 
